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Acceleration is in some ways old news. People have been bemoaning it and praising it in 
equal measure for at least two centuries. The essence of the debates remains the role of 
speed in society. Their relative speed has been identified as one of the characteristic 
features of societies. Speed is the metric of circulation, be that measured through the 
movement of ideas, information, money or materials. Such circulation has two dimensions –  
first, looking at the speed of traversing the earth, i.e. speed crossing space, and, second, the 
speed of processing and consumption, i.e. speed intensifying time. In the former the issue is 
the extension of our spatial horizons, in the latter it is the foreshortening of our temporal 
ones. One might then characterise places and eras, and many casually and habitually do, 
with regard to either of these dimensions. The two dimensions have also been classically 
combined in characterising the pressures for and effects of urbanisation. Urban settlements 
can be seen as machines for intensifying time use. Thus by creating a dense set of possible 
interactions in a small space the city uses space to accelerate time. As we move into an era 
characterised by more than half the world living in cities this process may then be seen as 
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becoming generally pervasive. Thus for instance, one might look at the lovely world map 
produced in Williams (2009 ) of how long surface transport would take to get to the nearest 
city of 50,000 or more people by combining information on terrain and road, rail and river 
networks. This isochrone map suggests that less than 10 per cent of the world’s land is more 
than 48 hours of ground-based travel from the nearest reasonable sized city. Even in 
Amazonia the extensive river networks and an increasing number of roads mean that only 
20 per cent of the land is more than two days from a city – which is roughly the same as for 
Quebec.  
This continues a line of studies linking distance, travel and the textures of everyday mobility 
that have become the hallmark of time-geography. It is revealing that some of the early 
classics of connecting time to geography speak to analysing the acceleration created by 
transport technologies. As Allen and Hamnett put it there has been a time-space 
compression comprising the ‘reordering of distance, the overcoming of spatial barriers, the 
shortening of time horizons, and the ability to link distant populations in a more immediate 
and intense manner’ (cited in Warf, page 8). In the inverse move to looking at intensification 
of time in place, we have studies of speed extending action across space. So early historical 
geographies looked time taken to cover distances between places like Lansing and Detroit in 
Michigan which were 1300 minutes apart by stagecoach in 1840, but the train had reduced 
that to 180 minutes by the 1870s and in the twentieth century the automobile reduced that 
to 80 minutes (Warf, page 15), or using isochrones maps – that is measuring distance 
travelled in a given time - in studies of expanding commuting such as Schjerning’s 1903 
analysis of Berlin (op. cit. p119-22) compared to more recent reconstructions of train speed 
isochrones for the nineteenth century in Britain (page 93) or the USA Eastern seabord (page 
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99). Warf’s book provides a rich history of the long run of time-space compression. In 
essence the book provides an epochal history divided into what it calls early, late and 
postmodern timespace. A society creates and inhabits forms of time and space that are both 
characteristic of it, and shape its characteristics. It is a story of shifting social, spatial and 
temporal relations written on a broad scale that uses timespace compression as a lens on 
social orders and transformations, depicting not only people’s interactions across the 
earth’s surface but also examining how they reveal their understandings of their world. In 
this there is little new in itself, rather Warf’s account provides an effective synthesis of a 
great deal of scholarship. It focuses on the big picture of the effects of different forms of 
communication and technology, linking them to changing political economies. In one sense 
then the book avoids both the fine grained analysis of numerous technologies as used in 
daily life which might complicate and challenge a variety of accounts. It professes a studied 
ambivalence regarding the exact relationship of political economy, technologies and 
timespace– in order to eschew a technologically determined account. If anything the 
political economic ordering is seen as driving and requiring shifts which leads to a 
characterisation of the epochs of timespace into broadly an early modern stretching from 
early colonialism to high empire, a modern period which coincides with a Fordist regime of 
capital and postmodern period of fragmented production, deepening financialised 
globalisation and fragmented timespaces.  
Hassan’s book rather more clearly foregrounds these different senses of constellations of 
politics, economics, technologies and timespace. Hassan provides a sound review of the 
numerous competing characterisations that have appeared – for instance characterising the 
present as timeless time (Castells), the society of transmission (Virilo), the videosphere 
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(Debray) and more. Hassan, as the title of ‘Empire’ hints, is challenging the contemporary 
framing of globalisation with the invocation of Hardt and Negri’s analysis. He presents a 
resolutely politicised analysis of the current total world of speed. The eventual framing of 
epochs echoes that of Warf, especially in the present era which is once again presented as 
somehow exceptional or novel. This does I suppose beg the question as to why the present 
is so often seen as exceptional in social analysis. Hassan though sees not only oppositions of 
present to past era but as much an emergence at a higher level. While clearly seeing the 
lineaments of power and control persisting, in ways that might be downplayed in liberal 
accounts, for Hassan the present era is characterised by the radical intensification of speed 
to become the organising principle of the contemporary era.  
Empire of speed places the nature of time at the centre of its account – looking at the 
ramifications and transformations from clock time, but most especially the dislocation of 
economic, social and political temporalities. Here he moves beyond Warf’s account in two 
ways. First, he shifts the emphasis from extension of processes over space to the 
intensification of process in place. Thus where Warf uses accelerating transport to open his 
account, Hassan chooses the way it took Chrysler fifty-four months and 3,100 people to 
develop and launch its K-car in the late 70s, while the Neon in the late-80s took less than 
thirty-three months with a workforce of 700, and by 2000 a new model was taking less than 
twenty-four months to design and launch (page 21). When space is discussed then it is 
about ensuring the accelerated circulation of commodities (page 60). Second, as can be 
seen from that example he looks at accelerations. That is the rate of increase in speed – not 
just the speed of a society but how fast that velocity is increasing and how our society 
develops ‘a fetish for open-ended speed in culture and society’ (page 23). Speed at a 
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cultural level is seen as he terms it, in a metaphor mixing up his pharmacology with his 
Marxism, an opiate or an addiction. It is thus very much more ambivalently positioned than 
for Warf, as here it assumes the force of something now driving us to run ever faster to 
stand still, and that never delivers its promised fulfilments. He echoes the sentiments of 
someone like Eriksen (2001) with his scepticism as the value of speed and its costs for 
human experience, but Hassan extends that analysis with a sophisticated analysis of political 
economy. 
Hassan dissects the types of time created by, facilitating and compelling acceleration. In part 
his story is about the transition from clock time to network time, but it is richer than that. 
One might wish that the discussion of the actual practices of clock time could have been 
enlarged – since that might offer some challenges to the speedy modernity outlined, and 
implicitly then to the hypermodern age following (for an account of the diversity of 
temporal practices associated with the rise of the clock see Glennie and Thrift 2009). But he 
asks us to think through the hegemonic timescapes and constellations of temporalities and 
technologies, with dominant and subsidiary temporalities. The dominant time of modernity 
is the accelerating Fordist production process, that of the second empire of speed is the 
network that produces a new enclosure, that eliminates the horizon in favour of a disparate 
fragmentary present and installs the ubiquitous always connected time of the network that 
disconnects us from local temporalities. Looking across to Warf’s volume, its focus on 
differential accessibility to different places stands as something of a corrective to the 
assumed ‘ubiquity’ here; though Warf too at the end emphasises the reach and uniformity 
of digital communications technologies. Hassan then moves on to looks at the pathologies 
resulting from this ever quickening quest for speed. The discussion here provides a good 
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focus on historiographies of anxiety  and ‘abbreviated thinking’ – which chimes again with 
Eriksen’s argument - but perhaps misses the historiographies of infatuations with speed so 
ably, if perhaps too acceptingly, depicted by Tomlinson (2007). Tomlinson’s volume also 
locates two different cultures of speed not necessarily as epochs but rather as two sides of 
the same coin – controlled speed and destructive speed. The continuing interrelationship of 
those rather than their successions might offer something more here to the story. 
What is presented in Empire of speed is clearly a temporalised political economy – and one 
that provocatively raises questions of the relations of economic, technological and temporal 
formation. Hassan knowingly engages with technological accounts and their determinist 
histories – arguing that to deny the efficacy of technologies entirely is surely wrong, while in 
the end for his account it is political economy that really drives the relationships. Specific 
economic formations may depend upon technical configurations, but the underlying logic of 
speed is found in the political economy. And formal politics is written strongly into that 
account, with the conclusion really being about the failure of liberal democracy to cope with 
the accelerated worlds. Here Hassan tells effectively a story of the death of reflection in 
governance in the face of speed – or rather the growing deficit in the capacity to reflect and 
control. Here we see a slightly different sense of epochs where the social and economic 
planning of the fordist period appears as a temporary stabilisation in the otherwise 
smoothly accelerating arc of speed. Perhaps oddly given the book’s title, what we see little 
of are the preceding temporalities of classically Imperial governance. One might make the 
case that the North American revolution was down to inadequate speeds of governance 
connecting London and its accelerating colonies, and there is a great deal to say on 
assumptions of linear fast time being located in imperial metropoles and cyclical traditional 
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time in the colonies (famously in works from Hegel, Mill and Marx on India, through to the 
educational governance of Macaulay), and then the actual practices of temporalised 
governance and chronological narration that served to create colonies (Kalpagam 1999). 
And for colonised, and colonising, cities there is a long history of the ‘intertwining of times, 
of attitudes, of the coming together and moving apart of past and present, [that] has 
historically created [an] urban kaleidoscope. ... where many times coexist simultaneously.... 
compressed, layered, juxtaposed in this ... schizophrenic space and time capsule’ (Mehrotra 
1999 pages 64, 67). 
Rosa and Scheuerman’s excellent collection picks up the political theme with a strong focus 
on speed and governance, indeed it concludes with essays on explicitly political process, 
reprinting Connolly on circulation, Virilio’s state of emergency and a reflection on 
accelerated modes of citizenship by Scheuerman. It is good to see political process as well as 
economic and social change so explicitly addressed. It also works very hard to historicise the 
claims for speed, with a section devoted to classic statements from the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries which serve to show the long history of social anxiety about speed. The 
continued relevance of, say, Schmitt’s critique on speed as rationale for executive action, 
and the positioning of legislatures as blockages out of step is remarkable. It also begs the 
question of what can we say is really different now? And if we examine the examples we 
also find more complex temporal patterning than just acceleration. Thus the legislature may 
be a too slow process, it may find legislation born out of time, but equally in the case of 
Britain the executive enabling acts Schmitt was criticising (those that outline a principle but 
leave the rules to the executive, and indeed let the executive amend the legislation to fit 
later needs) are founded upon 500 year old precedents known as Henry VIIIth clauses. It is a 
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sign of how this volume picks up on some of these counter-currents that the chapter by Urry 
contrasts the growth of ‘capital’s freedom from time and culture’s escape from the clock’ 
both being shaped decisively by information systems (page 189) with campaigns for a 
‘glacial time’ in movements such as Cittaslow or Commonground where he points to the 
revalorisation of things like patina, as accumulated value and the rising popularity of 
conservation movements. It might be argued these are simply different responses to a 
similar analysis of social trends – they too see acceleration as a danger, but one they believe 
amenable to social action (see for instance the account by Parkins and Craig 2005). These 
movements and the chapter do not question whether acceleration exists but whether it can 
be held or what its limits might be. If anything such struggles might be seen as confirming a 
popular belief in (deleterious) acceleration. Perhaps more striking is the critique offered by 
Stephen Breuer elegantly summarising Virilio’s theory of dromocratic revolution then taking 
on its reductivist central assumptions. This essay is important since while most people 
eschew the extremes to which Virilio goes, the drift of his argument is often left 
unchallenged. 
The core of the volume as one might expect is really an elaboration and debate over Rosa’s 
elegantly put thesis, developed from the work of Hermann Lübbe (who provides a summary 
in this volume) that acceleration can be demonstrated in the contraction of the meaningful 
present (Gegenwartsschrumpfung)– usefully defined as the period for which a stock of 
knowledge (or things, though that is less clear here) remain useful. This remains one of the 
most original and effective moves in the literature on acceleration that gets us beyond 
attempts to infer speed from social anxiety. The question which emerges from the chapters 
here on economic organisation is to what extent is acceleration an accurate 
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characterisation? The examples provided show increasing institutional instability resulting 
from fragmentation. The desynchronisation of different parts of social, political and 
economic life and even different parts within each of those realms, is convincingly 
articulated. Acceleration we might say must though involve a general direction of travel 
rather than just ever more frenetic but aleatory instabilities.  
And so, the grand narrative of acceleration seems rather too sweeping, too uniform at 
times. For sure, there is a dialectical sense that if there is one thing worse than being subject 
to acceleration, it is not being subject to it. But the sense Hassan offers of back eddies and 
different temporalities, that Urry finds, that Warf shows in differential compression only 
ever appears sotto voce. Indeed when counter-currents appear they are positioned as 
opposing, more or less successfully, the trend of hegemonic political economic organisation. 
But what of slowness produced by the world system? Many borders have been rendered 
less permeable to movement for the majority of people, as fast as electronic bits have 
overcome one kind of borders then others have reappeared. Nor is it all about the future. 
Increasingly digital media are being used to popularise and reanimate archives, the last half 
century has seen a massive revalorisation of traditional built forms, and increasingly value 
resides in slower production and indeed an economy of presence now equates privilege 
with personal contact. These books make powerful, if depressing, reading. They offer an 
impressive sweep and analysis of contemporary social change and the temporal 
transformations ensuing. The danger is that in depicting a dromocentric society they offer a 
dromocentric story and other temporalities get downplayed. Is that justifiable? It can be 
argued so. Is it just wishful thinking wanting alternative temporalities to be given more 
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room? Well, for sure, they do not appear likely to challenge the hegemonic time regime. But 
equally we should not overestimate the reach of that hegemony. 
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